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Summary 
This paper presents a choice experiment, which values reductions in mortality risk on Alpine 
roads. These roads are on one hand threatened by common road hazards, on the other 
hand they are also endangered by natural hazards such as avalanches and rockfalls. 
Drawing on choice data from frequently exposed and barely exposed respondents, we are 
not only able to estimate the VSL but to explore how the respondents differ in their 
individual willingness-to-pay depending on personal characteristics. To address 
heterogeneity in preferences for risk reduction, we use a non-linear conditional logit model 
with interaction effects. The best estimate of the VSL in the context of fatal accidents on 
Alpine roads is in the range of €4.9–5.4 million with distinct differences between the urban 
and the mountain sample groups. We find the VSL to be significantly altered by socio-
economic factors but only marginally altered by the type of hazard. 
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1 Introduction 
Alpine countries invest large amounts of money to mitigate natural hazards such as 
avalanches, floods, and rockfalls. Switzerland, for example, spends approximately 0.6% of its 
annual GDP on the mitigation of, and the recovery from, natural hazards (PLANAT 2005). 
While a part of these efforts is financed through private sources, public expenditures cover the 
lion’s share. Publicly funded mitigation programs have so far been focused on the cost-
efficient supply of mitigation. An optimal resource allocation would, however, not only 
consider the supply side but also the societal demand for safety improvements. 
Stated preferences provide an operational basis to deduce the societal demand for safety 
improvements. Surprisingly, few empirical studies have addressed these preferences in the 
context of natural hazards. Brouwer and Bateman (2005) studied society’s valuation of flood 
control measures in the Netherlands, Zhai and Ikeda (2006) analyzed the economic value of 
evacuations during flood events in Japan, and Leiter and Pruckner (2009) estimated the 
societal willingness-to-pay (WTP) for reductions in avalanche risk in Austria. All of these 
studies used the contingent valuation approach to elicit WTP measures. This paper contributes 
to the scarce literature by presenting a choice experiment to value improvements in traffic 
safety on Alpine roads. It has been shown that this stated-preference approach is well-suited 
to the study of societal preferences for mortality risk reductions and even allows individuating 
these preferences (see Alberini et al. 2007; Bosworth et al. 2008; Tsuge et al. 2005). 
Three research objectives guide our experimental investigation. First, we want to find 
out how much society is willing to pay for reductions in mortality risk on public roads in the 
Swiss Alps. Users of these roads are on one hand threatened by natural hazards such as snow 
avalanches and rockfalls. On the other hand, road users face the common risk of car accidents, 
whether it be through poor road conditions or through the dangerous behavior of other 
drivers. Our experiment confronted survey respondents with discrete choices from among 
hypothetical traffic safety programs to protect against these hazards and to reduce mortality 
risks on Alpine roads. Based on their choices, we estimate the value of statistical life (VSL), 
which has become the common metric to value lifesaving programs and environmental 
regulations involving risks to human life (Hammitt 2000). 
Second, psychometric research on risk suggests that characteristics such as 
voluntariness, controllability, and origin of a hazard affect people’s risk perception (Slovic 
1987; Slovic et al. 2000). Presumably, these factors affect the economic valuation of mortality 
risk reductions (McDaniels et al. 1992; Subramanian and Cropper 2000), but empirical 
evidence for these effects is relatively small (Chilton et al. 2002; Leiter and Pruckner 2009). 
To broaden this evidence, we analyze how specific characteristics of the hypothetical traffic 
safety programs and their perceived benefits affect the size of the VSL estimates.   3
Third, there is an ongoing discussion as to whether the VSL should be individuated 
according to age, wealth, health, and baseline risk (see Alberini et al. 2004; Baker et al. 2008; 
Eeckhoudt and Hammitt 2001; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1996; Sunstein 2004). We study how 
people differ in the WTP for risk reductions based on their socio-economic characteristics and 
their exposure to natural hazards. In other words, we analyze preference heterogeneity in the 
context of mortality risk, using a non-linear conditional logit model as introduced by Alberini 
et al. (2007). 
To address these research objectives, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 
begins with a brief overview of mortality risks on Alpine roads and compares these risks to 
other causes of death. We then describe the design of our survey, including the attributes and 
levels selected to characterize the choice tasks, and summarize the characteristics of the 
survey respondents. In Section 2.3, we theoretically deduce the VSL within the random utility 
framework of discrete choice analysis and explain our modeling approach to analyze 
preferences for mortality risk reductions. Selected results of the model estimations are 
presented in Section 2.4. We first report the results for different specifications of the non-
linear conditional logit model. We then test the scope and sensitivity of these results. In 
Section 2.5, we summarize our results and their implications for valuing mortality risk 
reductions in the context of natural hazards. 
 
2 Survey development, choice task, and sample characteristics 
2.1 Overview of mortality risks on Alpine roads 
Alpine roads are frequently exposed to natural hazards such as snow avalanches and rockfalls. 
Within the last 15 years, three individuals per year have been killed on average in accidents 
caused by rockfall or avalanche events on Swiss roads, while approximately 500 individuals 
per year have died in car accidents (BFS 2007a). Although the population at risk is larger in 
the case of car accidents (only about one quarter of the Swiss residents frequently drive on 
Alpine roads), the probability of dying in a rockfall or avalanche accident on a road is 
statistically small compared to other causes of death (Fig. 1). Yet, many people experience 
feelings of dread when considering the risks from natural hazards since they are involuntarily 
borne and are out of self-control. Dread has been found to be a perceptional factor that tends 
to increase the WTP for mitigation (Chilton et al. 2002; Chilton et al. 2006; Subramanian and 
Cropper 2000). In comparison, car accidents are a well-known risk and frequently analyzed in 
VSL studies (de Blaeij et al. 2003). In our survey, we used car accidents as a reference risk to 
see whether perceptional factors of natural hazards decrease or increase the societal WTP for 
traffic safety on Alpine roads.   4
 
Fig. 1 League table of statistical causes of death in Switzerland (compiled from BFS 2007a). 
 
Since the individual risk of dying in rockfall or avalanche accidents is small and the 
occurrence of such accidents is hardly predictable, it is a priori unknown whose life will be 
saved by the implementation of a traffic safety program. Anybody traveling on Alpine roads 
may potentially benefit from the risk reduction and, as far as public roads are concerned, no 
one can be excluded from this benefit. Thus, traffic safety on Alpine roads is a public good. 
The valuation of mortality risk reductions in the public goods context implies three major 
challenges. First, the respondent’s WTP for risk reduction depends on the size of the affected 
population or on the size that the respondent thinks of when evaluating the choice tasks 
(Green et al. 1994; Kahneman et al. 1993). Second, the magnitude of the cost figures is used 
as a mental anchor. Green et al. (1998) showed that the anchoring of prompted costs 
systematically influences the responses in stated-preference studies. This can cause large 
biases in the valuation of public goods, particularly if respondents have strategic incentives to 
over- or understate their true WTP. Third, respondents may have preferences for reductions in 
their own risk, in the risk to others, or in expressing mercy and solidarity with those people 
exposed to a risk (Jones-Lee 1991; Viscusi et al. 1988).  
We addressed the former two challenges by making the survey instrument as realistic as 
possible. We presented the risk reduction as a hypothetical referendum for financing the 
future maintenance of hazard mitigating infrastructure and clearly stated how many fatalities 
each traffic safety program could avert at which cost. To reduce strategic answering, we used 
a relative bid vehicle that personalized the cost of each of the alternative programs relative to   5
a percentage of the respondent’s last tax payment. The advantage of this relative bid vehicle is 
that, when converted to absolute values, it corresponds to the cost incurred to the respondent 
if the program were to be eventually implemented (Schläpfer 2008). 
The third challenge can hardly be resolved because the respondents’ preferences may be 
simultaneously composed of egoistic, altruistic and warm glow motives (Jones-Lee 1991; 
Kahneman and Knetsch 1992; Kahneman et al. 1999). In our study context, the individual risk 
is small and the benefits of the proposed traffic safety programs are concentrated on the most 
exposed people. We therefore conducted the choice experiment with respondents from two 
different regions of Switzerland. One sample consisted of people from the mountainous 
region around Davos, who are frequently exposed to natural hazards on Alpine roads. The 
other sample consisted respondents from the city of Zurich, who are unlikely to be frequently 
exposed. This split-sampling allows testing whether less exposed respondents may have 
altruistic values, resulting in concerns about the safety of others (Rodriguez and Leon 2004). 
 
2.2 Choice attributes and levels  
In the design phase of the study, four focus groups, with participants from both sample 
regions, were held to explore the relevant attributes of traffic safety on Alpine roads, the 
understanding of the relative bid vehicle, and the use of various risk communication aids (see 
Corso et al. 2001). The exploratory research also assisted in specifying the levels of each of 
the relevant attributes so that respondents could understand improvements in traffic safety as a 
result of changing attribute levels.  
For this purpose, we discussed the current level of mitigation measures to protect 
Alpine roads against natural hazards with a number of natural hazard experts consisting of 
representatives of the responsible authorities, civil engineers, and scientists. These expert 
interviews provided a semi-quantitative assessment of the current level of traffic safety on 
Alpine roads, upon which we developed ‘what-if’ scenarios for the case that mitigation 
measures would no longer be maintained. 
The exploratory research resulted in the selection of four attributes to describe traffic 
safety programs for Alpine roads: (1) the number of fatalities per year that are averted by a 
specific traffic safety program; (2) the number of years over which the program would reduce 
the risk; (3) the type of road hazard against which this program is effective; and (4) the cost of 
this program to the taxpayer. Table 1 summarizes the selected attributes and levels used in the 
choice experiment.   6
Table 1 Attributes and attribute levels in the discrete choice tasks. 
Attribute  Levels of the attribute 
(1)   Number of avoided fatalities per year  10, 12, 14, 16 
(2)   Duration of protection in years  10, 20, 30 
(3)   Type of road hazard  snow avalanches, rockfalls, car accidents 
(4)   Relative costs of the program as  
    percentage of the last tax payment 
1%, 2%, 3% 
 
 
Attribute (1) describes the benefit of the traffic safety programs in terms of averted 
fatalities. Based on the expert interviews, we assumed that the number of fatalities caused by 
natural hazards on Alpine roads would increase to 20 fatalities per year if current mitigation 
measures were no longer maintained, but could be kept at the current level if these measures 
were maintained into the future. Levels of the risk reduction were thus selected at 10, 12 14, 
and 16 averted fatalities per year. 
Attribute (2) captures the permanence of the risk reduction. We attempted to suggest 
realistic periods of mitigation benefits based upon the life expectancy of different mitigation 
measures to protect roads. In the focus groups, we observed that participants had difficulties 
in calculating the total number of averted fatalities over the proposed period of mitigation 
benefits. We therefore decided against presenting different mitigation periods between choice 
alternatives, but changed the period of mitigation between choice sets. 
Attribute (3) appoints the type of road hazard against which protection is provided. 
Avalanches and rockfalls were selected as natural hazards endangering traffic on Alpine 
roads, while car accidents were chosen as a reference risk to test for perceptional factors 
associated with these natural hazards. We explained that car accidents can be caused by blind 
curves, weak crash barriers, or speeding of other drivers to avoid emphasizing the self-
controlled factors of driving. 
Attribute (4) names the cost of each traffic safety program by describing it as a onetime 
payment proportional to the respondents’ last annual tax payment. We provided respondents 
with a conversion table through which they could easily derive their personalized cost-sharing 
for each of the programs (Fig. 2). Married respondents who have a joint tax invoice, were 
asked to divide their last tax payment by two in order to derive their personalized cost for 
each program.   7
 
Fig. 2 Conversion tool to calculate absolute bid amounts from percentages of taxes. 
 
Two premises determined the size of the relative bids. First, the aggregated bids should 
cover future expenditures for maintaining the protection of cantonal and communal roads 
against avalanches and rockfalls over the next 30 years. Second, the prompted bid amounts 
should allow for a large range of possible VSL values (Alberini et al. 2007). To comply with 
these validity requirements, we estimated the public mitigation expenditures for Alpine roads 
based on statistical data (BFS 2006; PLANAT 2005). Assuming that the annual mitigation 
expenditures will remain at their current level, the present value of mitigation expenditures 
over the next 30 years amounts to CHF 480–960 million, which is equal to 1.2–2.4% of the 
annual tax payments in Switzerland (BFS 2007b).
3 Consequently, the relative bid sizes were 
selected as 1%, 2%, and 3% of the last tax payment. 
Taking the average annual per capita tax payment of CHF 5,400 (BFS 2007b), the 
relative bids would mean a onetime payment of CHF 54 (€35), CHF 108 (€70), and CHF 162 
(€105).
4 Using the basic VSL model outlined in Section 3 and assuming discount rates for 
mortality risks between 0–15% (Viscusi and Aldy 2003), the absolute bids for the average 
taxpayer imply VSL values in the range of CHF 0.3–6.3 million (€0.2–4.1 million); the 
absolute bids for the highest tax class imply VSL values in the range of CHF 0.8–20.9 million 
(€0.5–13.6 million); and the absolute bids for the lowest tax class imply VSL values in the 
range of CHF 0.1–2.3 million (€0.1–2.7 million). This range is in-line with values found in 
two meta-analyses of VSL estimates (Mrozek and Taylor 2002; Viscusi and Aldy 2003). 
 
                                                 
3 For deriving these present values, we used a discount rate of 1.5% based on the inflation-adjusted ten-year spot 
interest rate on Swiss Confederation bonds. 
4 At the time of the data collection, one Swiss franc corresponded to 0.65 Euro.   8
2.3 Survey structure 
To collect the data, we developed a mail survey consisting of five parts. The first part opened 
with some attitudinal questions about the perception of natural hazards in general and their 
perceived threat to roads in particular. In the second part, respondents had to balance 
infrequent and severe avalanche accidents against frequent but less severe avalanche 
accidents. The third part contained the actual choice task, which prompted respondents to 
consider the hypothetical privatization of maintaining current mitigation measures against 
rockfall, snow avalanche and car accidents on cantonal and communal roads in the Swiss 
Alps. 
We introduced the choice task by stating that today only three individuals die each year 
in rockfall and avalanche accidents on roads, but that this number would quickly rise to 20 
fatalities per year if mitigation measures would no longer be maintained. Respondents were 
presented with the league table of annual mortality causes depicted in Fig. 1 to understand the 
mortality risks involved with avalanche, rockfall and ordinary car accidents and to align these 
risks with other causes of death.
5  
Respondents were then asked to imagine a national referendum for financing a traffic 
safety program. They were told that every household would have to make such a onetime 
payment on condition that the referendum was passed. The alternative traffic safety programs 
were presented within six choice sets. For each choice set, respondents had to indicate which 
of three options they prefer: program A, program B, or neither program. The last option was a 
conditional status quo, whose choice implied the willingness to accept a rise in fatalities from 
currently three to 20 per year. 
Since we selected three attributes with three levels and one attribute with four levels for 
describing the programs, 108 (= 3
3
  ×  4) different traffic safety programs were possible. 
Consequently, a full factorial design would have resulted in 1,944 different choice sets. 
(Remember that we did not vary the time attribute across alternatives in a specific choice set.) 
We used a shifted orthogonal experimental design built from conventional fractional factorials 
for linear models (Louviere et al. 2000) to reduce the number of choice sets. Based on this 
experimental design, we generated 54 pairs of alternative programs segmented into nine 
orthogonal blocks of six choice sets. According to Ferrini and Scarpa (2007), this 
experimental design is particularly appropriate when there is a high degree of uncertainty 
about the conditions that finally generate the choice-based dataset. 
The outlined procedure resulted in nine survey versions, each of which contained six 
different choice sets. To test whether different framings of the risk reduction attribute had an 
                                                 
5 This was the risk communication aid most preferred by the participants of the focus group research.   9
impact on the valuation of the traffic safety programs, we sent out two survey formats with 
different, but logically equivalent, framings. In this paper, we draw on the standard 
assumption that choice experiments are context-independent (Carlsson and Martinsson 2008). 
We therefore neglect the hypothesized framing effect in the discussion below, but will discuss 
it in a separate paper.
6 
Subsequent to the choice task, the fourth part of the survey posed some debriefing 
questions asking respondents to indicate how sure they were in their choices and whether they 
had applied specific decision heuristics. The survey closed with questions about the socio-
economic characteristics of the respondents. 
 
2.4 Respondents  
The survey was mailed to 900 individuals who had previously agreed in a phone recruitment 
to participate in the study. The sample was stratified by age and gender, with the number of 
respondents roughly reflecting the age distribution of the Swiss residential population. Half of 
the respondents were recruited in the mountainous region around Davos (the mountain 
sample) and the other half in the city of Zurich (the urban sample). We required respondents 
to be at least 18 years old, which is the minimum age for voting and for obtaining a driver’s 
license in Switzerland.  
Table 2 compares the socio-economic characteristics of our respondents to those of the 
Swiss residential population, confirming that our study sample is representative. There is a 
good representation of all age groups, even though respondents older than 69 years are 
slightly underrepresented. With regard to the last tax bill, there is a under sampling of the 
lowest income group. This correlates with the observation that sample has somewhat fewer 
respondents who have had only primary education. Overall, there is a fair match-up of the 
survey participants with the census data. 
In the choice analysis, we discarded respondents who had answered less than three of 
the six choice sets, assuming that they were either not willing or unable to respond. Three 
respondents chose only program A and one respondent chose only program B, even when this 
choice behavior was inconsistent with their earlier choices. These respondents were also 
excluded from the choice analysis. The data cleaning left us with 2,572 valid choices from 




                                                 
6 Preliminary results suggest that the framing effect is small and does not affect the VSL estimates.   10
Table 2 Comparison of the sample characteristics to the Swiss residential population. 
Variable  Study sample (N =433)  Swiss Population 
Respondents 
 Mountain  Sample 







































Annual tax payments 
b 
  CHF 2,000 or less 
 CHF  2,000–6,000 
 CHF  6,000–10,000 
 CHF  10,000–14,000 
 CHF  14,000–18,000 

















  Primary education  
 Secondary  education 
 University  education 
 Apprenticeship 













a Based on (BFS 2007b). 
b Approximation of the annual tax payments of the Swiss population based on the distribution of the direct 
federal tax payments (BFS 2009). 
 
Since there are no official statistics of the number of people driving on Alpine roads, we 
asked respondents how often they travel on these roads. Based on this self-declared risk 
exposure and official census data for the mountainous and urban regions of Switzerland 
(Hornung and Röthlisberger 2005), we defined the baseline population at risk as those 2 
million individuals who drive more than once a week on Alpine roads. As described below, 
we used this figure to quantify the annual statistical mortality risk reduction provided by each 
of the traffic safety programs. 
   11
3 Discrete choice model 
3.1 Random utility framework for conditional logit models 
Discrete choice models are founded in random utility theory (McFadden 2001). Applied to 
mortality risks on Alpine roads, random utility theory assumes that the unobserved utility of a 
specific traffic safety program k can be split into a deterministic component expressed by the 
indirect utility function V and a random component ε that captures moods, affects and other 
emotionally driven decision shortcuts used by individual i to evaluate the program k. Clearly, 
the indirect utility V from choosing program k is determined by the program’s attributes and 
the personal characteristics of individual i.  
Formally, let Xik denote a vector of explanatory variables describing program k and 
individual i, and β denote the corresponding vector of coefficients to be estimated. Then, the 
random utility perceived by individual i from choosing program k can be written as: 
 
ik ik ik ik ik V V U ε ε + = + = ) ; ( β X  (1) 
 
where εik is the random component of an unknown distribution εik ~ D(θε), with θε denoting 
the parameters of this distribution.  
The dichotomy of this random utility model (RUM) allows a decision framework to be 
constructed by assuming that individual i prefers mitigation program k over the alternative 
mitigation program j, if the utility entailed by this program k is larger than that of any other 
program in the choice set J. Formally, the probability of choosing mitigation program k over 
any other program j in the choice set is given by: 
 
]. , Pr[ ) , ; | Pr( k j V V k ij ij ik ik ik ≠ ∀ + > + = ε ε θε β X  (2) 
 
Based on distributional assumptions on the random component, several specifications of the 
RUM model have been proposed (Walker and Ben-Akiva 2002). The widely used conditional 
logit specification assumes that the random component is independently and identically (IID) 
drawn from a Type-I extreme value distribution, i.e. εij ~ EV1(θε). The probability that 






ij ik i V V k )] ; ( exp[ )] ; ( exp[ ) , ; | Pr( β X β X β X µ µ µ , (3) 
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where µ is a scale parameter usually normalized to one, implying constant error variance 
(Louviere et al. 2000). 
The estimation of the coefficient vector β involves maximizing the likelihood of the 
stated choices. When N respondents are asked to engage in a series of Q choice tasks with J 
choice alternatives, the maximization requires defining a binary choice indicator λijq. This 
binary indicator takes the value λijq = 1 if individual i chooses the program j in choice task q, 
and otherwise takes the value λijq = 0. Accordingly, the log-likelihood function LL to be 












ijq i i j LL
111
] , ; | ln[Pr( ) , ; | ( ε ε θ λ θ λ β X β X . (4) 
 
3.2 Estimating the VSL from discrete choice data 
Estimating the VSL from discrete choices on alternative traffic safety programs requires 
specifying the indirect utility function given in Eq. (1). In our study, the indirect utility of any 
traffic safety program j depends on its risk reduction Rj and on its cost Cij, which varies for 
each individual i due to the use of the relative bid vehicle. Characteristics of the traffic safety 
program j, denoted by the vector Wj, and of the respondent i, denoted by the vector Zi, may 
also go into the indirect utility function. Since these covariates do not vary over the repeated 
choices of an individual, their vectors have to be interacted with either the risk or the cost 
parameter. A generic form of the indirect utility function  ) ; ( β Xij V  is then obtained as: 
 
), ( ) ( 3 2 1 3 2 1 β W β Z α W α Z j i ij j i j ij C R V + + + + + = β α  (5) 
 
where α1 and β1 are the coefficients of the risk and cost parameter, and α2,     α3, β2 and β3 are 
coefficient vectors of the interaction effects between these parameters and selected covariates. 
The particular design of our choice task requires some additional specifications. While 
the cost Cij of each program j was implemented as a onetime payment to respondent i, the risk 
reduction was implemented as a stream of annual risk reductions provided by program j over 
the period of mitigation Tj. We used a constant exponential discounting model to discount the 
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where δ is the implicit discount rate and πj denotes the annual risk reduction by program j, 
which is assumed to be constant over the period of mitigation.
7 By inserting Eq. (6) into the 
indirect utility function of Eq. (5), we may estimate the discount rate δ directly from the 
choice data. Technically, this makes our model a non-linear conditional logit model. 
In line with Alberini et al. (2007), we then posit that the marginal utility of risk 
reduction for respondent i is given by the compound coefficient vector α = (α1 + Ziα2 + Wjα3) 
and the marginal utility of wealth is given by the compound coefficient vector β = (β1 + Ziβ2 + 
Wjβ3). Since the VSL is defined as the WTP for a marginal decrease in risk, it results from the 
ratio of the estimated coefficient vectors:  ) ˆ / ˆ ( β α  = (∂V/∂Rj)/(∂V/∂Cij). 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Qualitative results 
The respondents had relatively homogenous attitudes toward natural hazards in general and to 
their perceived threat to Alpine roads in particular. When asked about how they assess their 
own risk of being killed through a snow avalanche or a rockfall, 69% of the respondents felt 
barely endangered, 27% felt somewhat endangered, and only 2% felt strongly endangered; 
another 2% found it hard to tell. When comparing the risk of snow avalanches or rockfalls to 
roads with common road hazards, 84% of the respondents stated that they found the latter risk 
more threatening, 11% found both risks equally threatening and only 3% found the risk of 
natural hazards more threatening; again 2% found it hard to tell. With regard to the current 
level of protection against snow avalanches and rockfalls, 67% of the respondents stated that 
roads are sufficiently protected while 33% would like to see better protection. Against our 
expectations, answers to these perceptional questions by the mountain and the urban samples 
were not statistically different. 
In Table 3, we examine the choice frequencies for traffic safety programs against the 
different hazard types. Neither program was chosen in about 20% of the choice sets, 
suggesting that respondents were not rejecting the programs without due consideration. The 
choice frequency of programs against rockfall accidents was slightly higher than for programs 
that protect against car accidents or avalanche accidents. 
 
                                                 
7 Since the number of people at risk on Alpine roads was determined at 2 million people, the annual risk 
reduction πj provided by a traffic safety program j lies between 5 × 10
–6 and 8 × 10
–6 avoided fatalities.   14
Table 3 Pattern of preferences for traffic safety programs against different road hazards. 
Preferred traffic safety program  Percentage of choices 
… against snow avalanches  24.8% 
… against rockfalls  28.0% 
… against car accidents  26.3% 
… neither  20.9% 
 
4.2 The basic VSL model 
In the next sections, we report on selected results of the non-linear conditional logit model as 
outlined in Section 2.3. We begin by presenting two estimates of the basic VSL model (Model 
I), whose indirect utility function includes only the personalized cost and the discounted risk 
reduction as explanatory variables (see Table 4). The two estimates of Model I differ only in 
the number of choice observations. While the first estimate includes the full sample of 
observations, the second is restricted to the observations of those respondents who also 
answered the attitudinal questions necessary to estimate the interaction models presented 
below (see Models III–IV).  
The differences between the estimated coefficients are relatively small, indicating that 
our basic model is relatively robust against restrictions in the sample size. All coefficients are 
significant and have the expected signs. The coefficient of the risk parameter is positive, 
indicating that the respondents valued risk reductions as benefits, while the coefficient of the 
cost parameter is negative showing that spending private money on traffic safety programs 
entails a disutility. The discount rate δ was estimated at 11.8% and 11.1% respectively, which 
is at the upper range of discount rates reported in market-based VSL studies (Viscusi and 
Aldy 2003). The coefficient estimates in Table 4 imply a VSL of CHF 8.26 million (€5.35 
million) for the full sample and of CHF 7.64 million (€4.95 million) for the restricted sample.
8 
The corresponding WTP for the average traffic safety program is between CHF 49.70–53.70 
(€32.30–34.90).
9 Standard errors around the VSL estimates were calculated at CHF 1.41 
million (€0.91 million) for the full sample and at CHF 1.32 million (€0.85 million) for the 
restricted sample, using the Delta method (see Greene 2008: 69). 
 
                                                 
8 Technically, the VSL is estimated as  ] ˆ / ˆ [ 1 1 β α −  × 1 million. The multiplication by one million is necessary 
since we coded the risk reduction as 5, 6, 7 and 8 instead of 5 × 10
−6, 6 × 10
−6, 7 × 10
−6 and 8 × 10
−6. 
9 The individual mean WTP for the average traffic safety program is calculated by multiplying the VSL value by 
the mean risk reduction provided by the programs, which is equal to 6.5 × 10
−6.   15
Table 4 Model I: Basic conditional logit model (full and the restricted sample). 
Parameters  Full Sample  Restricted Sample 
 Coefficient 
a   t-stat Coefficient 
a   t-stat 
Marginal utility of risk reduction (α1)  0.02809 
(0.00481) 
 5.814  0.02656 
(0.00466) 
 5.700 
Marginal utility of cost (β1)   –  0.00340 
(0.00031) 
  – 10.983    – 0.00348 
(0.00032) 
 –  10.824 
Discount rate (δ)  0.11808 
(0.02580) 
 4.577  0.11102 
(0.02529) 
 4.390 
Number of observations (Q)   2,572     2,388   
Number of respondents (N)   433     402   
Log-likelihood function (LL1)   –  2,578.46     –  2,398.46   
Likelihood ratio index 
b   0.0875     0.0858   
a Standard errors in parentheses; 
b Calculated as 1 – LL1/LL0, where LL0 denotes the log-likelihood function of the constant-only model. 
 
4.3 The effect of wealth on the VSL 
The use of the relative bid vehicle allows exploration of how the VSL varies with wealth. 
Economic theory suggests that the VSL marginally increases with increasing wealth.
10 
Hammitt and Treich (2007) provide two reasons for this wealth effect. First, wealthier people 
lose more in absolute terms when they die. Second, their utility cost of spending is smaller 
due to the standard assumption of decreasing marginal utility with respect to wealth. To test 
for this wealth effect, Model II includes an interaction between the personalized cost of the 
program Cij and the logarithm of the last tax bill τi, i.e. Vij = α1 × Rj + β1 × Cij + βτ × Cij × ln(τi), 
                                                 
10 To prove this assertion, we draw on the definition of the VSL as the marginal rate of substitution between 
wealth and mortality risk. The standard model of WTP for changes in mortality risk defines the VSL as 
(Hammitt 2000):  , VSL ) ( ' ) ( ' ) 1 (
) ( ) (
w pv w u p




− = ≡  where p is the individual’s probability of dying during a defined 
period and u(w) and v(w) denote the utilities derived from wealth conditional on surviving or dying in that 
period. (The primes indicate first derivatives with respect to wealth.) Some assumptions are commonly made on 
the form of the utility functions: (i) survival is preferred to death: u(w) > v(w); (ii) the marginal utility of wealth 
is non-negative and greater in life than in death: u'(w) > v'(w) ≥ 0; and (iii) individuals are risk averse with 
respect to wealth: u"(w) ≤ 0, v"(w) ≤ 0. Under these assumptions, the first derivative of the VSL with respect to 
wealth is always positive (∂VSL/∂w > 0) and the second derivative is always non-negative (∂
2VSL/∂w
2 ≥ 0).   16
whereby ln(τi) serves as a measure of the utility of wealth.
11 The interaction term captures the 
difference between how much wealthier people and poorer people are willing to pay, relative 
to their wealth status. Table 5 presents the estimations of this model using both the full and 
the restricted sample of observations. 
 
Table 5 Model II: Conditional logit model with tax interaction (full and restricted sample). 
Parameters  Full Sample  Restricted Sample 
 Coefficient 
a   t-stat Coefficient 
a   t-stat 




 6.255  0.03706 
(0.00600) 
 6.180 
Marginal utility of cost (β1)   –  0.01677 
(0.00158) 
  – 10.614    – 0.01718 
(0.00164) 
 –  10.452 
Interaction with the cost parameter: 











Discount rate (δ)  0.13948 
(0.02652) 
 5.258  0.13281 
(0.02590) 
 5.128 
Number of observations (Q)   2,572     2,388   
Number of respondents (N)   433      402   
Log-likelihood function (LL1)   –  2,538.99     –  2,360.06   
Likelihood ratio index 
b   0.1014     0.1004   
a Standard errors in parentheses;  
b Calculated as 1 – LL1/LL0, where LL0 denotes the log-likelihood function of the constant-only model. 
 
In line with theoretical expectations, we find that the VSL marginally increases with 
wealth, i.e.  ∂
2VSL/∂τi
2 > 0. In other words, wealthier respondents are willing to pay 
proportionally more on the traffic safety programs than poorer respondents. Fig. 3 depicts the 
effect of the last tax bill on the size of the VSL estimates indicating that, at low wealth levels, 
the VSL is relatively inelastic toward changes in wealth (the elasticity of the VSL toward 
changes from CHF 2,000 to CHF 4,000 in tax payments is 0.53), but becomes increasingly 
elastic at higher wealth levels (the elasticity of the VSL toward changes from CHF 16,000 
beyond CHF 18,000 in tax payments is 1.87). The arc elasticity of the VSL over the range of 
tax amounts is determined at 1.01, but shrinks to 0.84 when weighted by the class-frequency 
                                                 
11 We tested other functional forms of the utility of wealth, but these functions did either provide much lower 
log-likelihood functions or did not converge. Consequently, we used the log form and estimated the tax-specific 
VSL(τi) ≡  (∂Vij /∂Rj /∂Vij/∂Cij) = [α1 /(β1 + βτ × ln(τi))]. For computational ease, we coded the tax payment τi as 2, 
4, 8, 12, 16 and 18.   17
of the taxpayers in the sample. It should, however, be warned that the estimation of VSL 
values of the second highest tax class was based on a limited number of respondents (N = 18). 
 
 
Fig. 3 Tax class-specific VSL values estimated based on Model II. 
 
The above reported elasticity cannot be directly converted to income elasticities because 
the Swiss tax law permits tax deductions, which depend on the home canton and individual 
characteristics that are not necessarily related to income and wealth. However, since 
Switzerland has a progressive tax regime, the corresponding income elasticities of the 
majority of respondents are larger than unity. This is inline with assertions by McFadden and 
Leonard (1993) and Schläpfer (2008) that income elasticities of WTP less than unity 
constitute grounds for doubting the validity of stated-preference studies. 
 
4.4 The effect of personal characteristics on the VSL 
Personal characteristics other than wealth also affect the WTP for traffic safety on Alpine 
roads. Table 6 presents two interaction models estimated with the restricted sample, which 
individuate the marginal utilities of risk reduction and wealth, as urged by Sunstein (2004). In 
this way, it becomes possible to identify sources of heterogeneity in preferences for mortality 
risk reductions. Model III interacts the risk parameter with the personal socio-economic 
characteristics and the cost parameter with the last tax payment of the respondent, so that the 
VSL becomes conditional on the respondent’s background.   18
Table 6 Models III–IV: Conditional logit model with personalized marginal utility of risk reduction and cost. 
Parameters  Model III  Model IV 
 Coefficient 
a   t-stat Coefficient 
a   t-stat 
Marginal utility of risk reduction (α1)  0.03783 
(0.00668) 
 5.659  0.04475 
(0.00764) 
 5.859 
Interactions with the risk parameter:         
 Age   –  0.00036 
(0.00007) 
  – 4.791    – 0.00039 
(0.00008) 
 –  4.900 
  Gender (female = 1)  0.00522 
(0.00229) 
 1.884  0.00469 
(0.00251) 
 1.871 














 Sample  affiliation  × university degree 
  (urban academics = 1) 
 –  0.02035 
(0.00687) 
  – 2.686    – 0.02021 
(0.00748) 
 –  2.703 
  Experience with natural hazards 
  (previous experience = 1) 
     –  0.00651 
(0.00237) 
 –  2.752 
  Avalanche accident (yes = 1)        – 0.00277 
(0.00123) 
 –  2.250 
  Rockfall accident (yes = 1)        – 0.00245 
(0.00225) 
 –  1.091 
Marginal utility of cost (β1)   –  0.01706 
(0.00167) 
 10.229    –  0.01841 
(0.00171) 
 –  10.799 
Interactions with the cost parameter:         
  Log of last tax payment  0.00515 
(0.00053) 
 9.693  0.00535 
(0.00053) 
 10.172 
  Perceived safety on roads 
  (current protection is insufficient = 1) 
   0.00256 
(0.00062) 
 4.153 







Number of observations (Q)   2,388     2,388   
Number of respondents (N)   402     402   
Log-likelihood function (LL1)    – 2,304.51      – 2,286.26   
Likelihood ratio index 
b   0.1216     0.1285   
a Standard errors in parentheses; 
b Calculated as 1 – LL1/LL0, where LL0 denotes the log-likelihood function of the constant-only model. 
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The significant coefficient of the interaction term between a sample indicator dummy 
(mountain sample = 0; urban sample = 1) and the risk parameter indicates that, ceteris 
paribus, respondents from the urban sample had a 30% higher marginal utility of risk 
reduction (see Table 6). While surprising at first glance, we offer two possible explanations 
for this result. First, people who are more familiar with natural hazards might have a higher 
risk acceptance, as they see these risks as part of living in the mountains. Corresponding 
statements made by focus group participants from the mountainous region support this 
explanation. Second, respondents from the urban sample have altruistic motives that increase 
their marginal utility of risk reduction (Rodriguez and Leon 2004), although their personal 
benefit from traffic safety on Alpine roads is smaller than that of respondents from the 
mountain sample. This explanation is supported by answers made by respondents from the 
urban sample to the debriefing questions at the end of the survey. 
To further explore the first explanation, we included two interaction terms: a two-way 
interaction between the risk parameter and a dummy indicating whether the respondent holds 
a university degree, and a three-way interaction between this university dummy, the risk 
parameter and the sample indicator dummy. This revealed that respondents with an academic 
background generally had a higher marginal utility of risk reduction, and that this preference 
was particularly strong for academics from the mountain sample. Accordingly, non-academics 
from the mountain sample placed a much lower value on risk reduction than the rest of the 
respondents. The debriefing questions revealed that non-academics from the mountain sample 
feel entitled to the benefits of mitigation and are not willing to privately contribute to its 
financing. 
The interaction term between the age of the respondent and the risk parameter indicates 
a decrease in the marginal utility of risk reductions by approximately 0.9% per life year. This 
is in line with empirical observations that the VSL decreases with age (Viscusi and Aldy 
2003). Alberini et al. (2004) propose two explanations for this age effect that could affect the 
valuation of reduced mortality riskthe individual risk exposure and the utility of wealth. As 
risk exposure on Alpine roads presumably declines with increasing age (older people tend to 
travel less), we tested a three-way interaction between risk, self-reported exposure and age. 
This interaction term had a negligibly small effect on the age coefficient, suggesting that the 
age effect is not caused by correlations between exposure and age but by decreasing utility of 
wealth. 
The interaction term between the gender of the respondent and the risk parameter was 
barely significant at the 5% level and further testing by means of a bootstrap re-estimation 
with 200 random resamplings resulted in a non-significant coefficient. This corresponds with 
observations by Davidson and Freudenburg (1996) who found that women and men have   20
similar perceptions of most environmental risks. Since, in both samples, men were more 
likely to hold a university degree than women, we tested for a three-way interaction effect 
between the gender, the risk parameter and the university dummy, which also turned out to be 
insignificant. Thus, gender had no significant impact on the valuation tasks in this study.  
The interaction term between the tax payment and the cost parameter resulted in 
qualitatively similar results to those in Model II. We additionally tested a three-way 
interaction between the cost parameter, the last tax payment and the sample indicator dummy, 
which rejected the hypothesis that the two samples differed with regard to wealth in a manner 
that influenced the valuation of the costs. 
 
4.5 The effects of perceptional factors on the VSL 
Model IV extends Model III by including further interaction terms between the risk parameter 
and the road hazard type, between the risk parameter and perceptional factors of risk, and 
between the cost parameter and the respondent’s appraisal of the current level of safety on 
Alpine roads. To this end, car accidents were coded as the reference risk, i.e. negative 
(positive) coefficients of the avalanche and rockfall dummies in 6 imply a decrease (increase) 
in the perceived risk compared to car accidents. 
The coefficient of the interaction term between the risk parameter and the rockfall 
dummy was not significant, indicating that the perceived risk from car accidents and rockfall 
accidents does not differ in a way that affects the demand for risk reduction. In comparison, 
the interaction term between the risk parameter and the avalanche dummy was significant and 
had a negative sign, suggesting that avalanche accidents were perceived as less worthy to be 
mitigated. One possible explanation for this different perception of the three road hazard types 
is that avalanche accidents are relatively rare whereas car accidents and rockfall accidents 
frequently occur, although they do not always cause fatalities. We tested an additional 
interaction effect between the risk parameter, the hazard type and the sample indicator 
dummy. This three-way interaction was not significant, indicating that the perception of the 
road hazard type was not systematically different between the sample groups. 
The interaction term between self-reported experience and the risk parameter showed 
that respondents, who stated that they or their relatives had prior experiences with natural 
hazards, valued the marginal utility of risk reductions less than respondents who had no prior 
experiences. The same effect was found for the self-declared exposure but we omitted this 
variable in the presented models due to its strong correlation with the sample affiliation of the 
respondent, which would have induced problems of heteroscedasticity (Greene 2008). In line 
with observations from psychometric risk research (see Slovic et al. 2000), we conclude that   21
respondents, who had more knowledge about natural hazards, perceived the risks on Alpine 
roads as less threatening than those who had no prior experiences. 
As expected, the interaction term between the cost parameter and the attitude toward the 
current protection on Alpine roads was significant. Respondents who stated that the current 
level of safety against natural hazards on Alpine roads was insufficient were willing to spend 
14% more on the traffic safety programs than those who felt that current safety was sufficient.  
The coefficients of the other interaction effects in Model IV were of comparable size to 
those estimated in Model III (see 6). A likelihood ratio test (LRT) showed that the inclusion 
of the additional interaction terms between the risk parameter and the hazard type and 
between the cost parameter and the attitude toward current safety did significantly improve 
the model (LRT: χ
2
〈13–9〉 = 36.50; P < 0.001). By applying the estimated coefficients to the 
actual choice observations of the respondents, one can generate distributions of the VSL 
values implied with these choices (Fig. 4). These distributions illustrate that, depending on the 
individual characteristics, the marginal rate of substitution between risk reduction and money 
varies within a broad range. The 95% percentile was CHF 16.4 million (€10.7 million) for the 
distribution based on Model III and CHF 19.2 million (€12.5 million) for the distribution 
based on Model IV. The mean values of these VSL distributions (Model III: CHF 5.7 million; 
Model IV: CHF 8.2 million) were substantially above the median values (Model III: CHF 4.2 
million; Model IV: CHF 4.3 million), suggesting that wealthy taxpayers contribute over-
proportionally to the VSL point estimate of Model I. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Distributions of the personalized VSL estimated based on Model III (Panel A) and Model IV (Panel B). 
The distribution mean VSL values are CHF 5.74 million (Model III) and CHF 8.24 million (Model IV), the 95% 
percentiles are CHF 16.37 million (Model III) and CHF 19.22 (Model IV).   22
4.6 Scope and sensitivity tests 
The validity of stated-preference studies is often challenged by opponents who argue that, 
being of hypothetical nature, the stated choices fail to be related to real transactions as 
observed in markets. It has therefore become standard to test the scope and sensitivity of the 
results obtained from stated-preference studies (Heberlein et al. 2005; Leiter and Pruckner 
2009). The basic requirement in every scope test of VSL estimates is that respondents receive 
a positive marginal utility from risk reductions and a negative marginal utility of costs, i.e. 
they are willing to pay for risk reductions, but not at any price. The results of Models I–IV 
conform to these requirements. 
To control for the reliability of our original estimates, we cross-validated these results 
using re-estimations with the bootstrap method (Efron and Tibshirani 1993). These re-
estimations relied on 200 replications of random resamplings with replacement from the 
sample of observations, where each of these replications consisted of Q = 2,388 draws. The 
bootstrap estimations yielded robust standard errors around the bootstrap coefficients, which 
allowed computing 95% confidence intervals by multiplying the bootstrap standard errors of 
the coefficient estimates by 1.96.  
We then re-estimated the models by dropping all observations (i) from those 
respondents who stated in the debriefing questions that they felt particularly uncertain about 
their choices and (ii) from the first and last choice set of every respondent. Neither of these re-
estimations altered the broad picture of the model results. The coefficient estimates of these 
restricted models were all within their corresponding 95% confidence intervals, though some 
of the interaction effects deviated substantially from the original model estimates. Table 7 
exemplifies this validity check for the re-estimations of Model IV, indicating that our original 
coefficient estimates are robust against confounding influences of hidden variables. 
The validity of stated-preference studies is not only determined by scope sensitivity, but 
also by the robustness of the valuation measures toward changes in specific attribute levels. 
We therefore analyzed the effects of marginal changes in the risk and cost parameters of the 
traffic safety programs. First, consider a marginal increase in the cost Cik of the traffic safety 
program k. We were interested in how much this increase would decrease the probability 
Pr(k|i) that individual i had chosen this program.   23
Table 7 Comparison of the coefficient estimates of the re-estimated Model IV with the 95% confidence intervals 
obtained from bootstrap standard errors. 
Parameters  95% confidence interval  Restricted model coefficients 
  lower limit  upper limit  Coefficient
 a Coefficient
 b 
Marginal utility of risk reduction (α1) 
Interactions with the risk parameter: 
 age 
  gender (female = 1) 
  university degree (yes = 1) 
  sample affiliation (urban sample = 1) 
 sample  affiliation  × university degree  
  (urban academics = 1)  
  experience with natural hazards 
  (previous experience = 1) 
  avalanche accident (yes = 1) 
  rockfall accident (yes = 1) 
 0.02806  0.06374 
 
  – 0.00057  – 0.00022 
 –  0.00065  0.01048 
 0.01139  0.04663 
 0.00522  0.02131 
  – 0.03794  – 0.00412 
 
  – 0.01215  – 0.00115 
 
  – 0.00522  – 0.00047 
 –  0.00776  0.00261 
 0.04461  0.04688 
 
  – 0.00032  – 0.00038 
 0.00758  0.00555 
 0.02199  0.02934 
 0.00885  0.01163 
  – 0.01140  – 0.02124 
 
  – 0.00857  – 0.00672 
 
  – 0.00287  – 0.00209 
 –  0.00292  0.00028 
Marginal utility of cost (β1) 
Interactions with the cost parameter: 
  log of last tax payment 
  perceived safety on roads 
  (current protection is insufficient = 1) 
   – 0.02203  – 0.01497 
 
 0.00430  0.00647 
 0.00139  0.00370 
  – 0.01687  – 0.01997 
 
 0.00478  0.00590 
 0.00258  0.00253 
Discount rate (δ)   0.06237  0.16703   0.10786  0.11643 
a Sample restriction by dropping observations of uncertain respondents. 
b Sample restriction by dropping observations of the first and of the last choice set for each respondent. 
 
By taking the partial derivative of the choice probability as defined in Eq. (3) with 
respect to the cost parameter, the marginal effect becomes (the detailed derivation is given in 
the Appendix): 
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where β = (β1 + Ziβ2 + Wjβ3) denotes the compound coefficient vector of the cost interactions. 
Similarly, the marginal effect of a change in the discounted risk reduction Rk on the choice 
probability of program k is given by (the detailed derivation is given in the Appendix): 
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where α = (α1 + Ziα2 + Wjα3)     denotes the compound coefficient vector of the risk reduction 
interactions. 
Since the marginal effects differ across individuals and choice sets, we calculated the 
weighted marginal mean effects over all choice observations Q, using the weighting 
procedure outlined by Louviere et al. (2000) to adjust for outlying estimates of choice 
probabilities that could otherwise lead to overestimations of marginal effects.
12 Table 8 gives 
the weighted mean marginal effects of changes in the risk and cost parameter for Models III–
IV. These mean marginal effects show that a unit change, either in the discounted risk 
reduction or in the cost of a program, has an insignificantly small impact on the choice 
probability of a traffic safety program. 
 
Table 8 Marginal effects and point elasticities of changes on the choice probability of traffic safety programs. 
Variable    Model III    Model IV 
Marginal mean effect of change in cost    – 0.00149    – 0.00151 
Point elasticity of cost    – 0.35096    – 0.35101 
Marginal mean effect of change in risk reduction    0.00727    0.00747 
Point elasticity of risk reduction    0.73851    0.74664 
 
Based on the marginal effects, it is straightforward to derive the (weighted) point 
elasticities of changes in risk reduction and in costs as E(Rk) = M(Rk) × R k × Pr(k|i)
–1 and 
E(Cik) = M(Cik) × Cik × Pr(k|i)
–1, respectively (Greene 2008). These point elasticities measure 
the percentage change in the choice probability of a particular program with respect to a 1% 
change in either the risk reduction or the cost parameter of this particular program. For the 
most extensive Models III–IV, the choice probability was found to be relatively inelastic (–1 
< E(Cik) < 0, 0 < E(Rk) < 1; see Table 8), suggesting that the VSL estimations based on our 
non-linear conditional choice model are robust against small changes in the key attributes of 
the traffic safety programs. 
 
                                                 
12 Louviere et al. (2000) define the weighted marginal effect of changes in the attribute X for all observations Q 
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1 1 ] ) Pr( ) Pr( ) ( M [ ) ( M , where q denotes one choice observation, Mq(X) is the marginal 
effect of a change in X in this particular observation, and Pr(q) denotes the choice probability of every single 
choice observation q.   25
5 Discussion and conclusions 
This article has analyzed public preferences for mortality risk reductions on Alpine roads. 
Using a choice experiment, we asked respondents how much they would be willing to 
contribute in order to maintain the current level of traffic safety on these roads. The prompted 
tradeoffs between risk reduction and money imply a VSL in the range of CHF 7.6 to 8.3 
million (€4.9 to 5.4 million), which is in the ballpark of VSL estimates obtained from other 
stated preference studies in the context of public risk to life and limb (Alberini et al. 2007; 
Hultkrantz et al. 2006). Our VSL estimates are somewhat above the figure of CHF 5 million 
(€3.25 million) currently used by the Swiss administration to evaluate mitigation programs 
against natural hazards (PLANAT 2005). On the other hand, they are distinctly lower than 
estimates of a Swiss labor market study (Baranzini and Ferro Luzzi 2001), which obtained 
inflation adjusted VSL values in the range of CHF 10.8 to 16.2 million (€7.0 to 10.5 million). 
Mortality risks on Alpine roads are predominantly borne by frequent road users and are 
thus unevenly spread over the population. We therefore recruited respondents from a 
mountainous region and from an urban region of Switzerland, representing exposed and 
unexposed people. To our surprise, respondents from the mountain group were ceteris paribus 
willing to pay less for the proposed traffic safety programs, though they are more exposed and 
would hence benefit more from the reductions in risk. We find two explanations for this 
apparent violation of rational choice behavior.  
First, an interaction effect between the origin and the education of the respondents 
revealed that non-academics from the mountain sample had a significant lower marginal 
utility of risk reduction. As indicated by comments on returned survey questionnaires, this 
group of respondents felt that it was the duty of the government to take care of their safety on 
Alpine roads. They refused to make private contributions to the proposed safety traffic 
programs more often than the rest of the respondents. (The choice frequency of the neither 
option was at 25% for non-academics from the mountain sample, while it was at 16% for the 
remaining respondents.) We conclude that a withdrawal of public resources for the protection 
of Alpine roads, as hypothesized in the description of our choice task, caused protest behavior 
among respondents who feel entitled to safety on Alpine roads.  
Second, past research has found that preferences for public goods are determined by 
complicated patterns of egoistic and altruistic motives (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992; 
Kahneman et al. 1999). Altruism is a non-use value that becomes relevant for the economic 
valuation of mortality risk reductions if individuals are concerned about the safety of others 
but indifferent with respect to further determinants of welfare (Jones-Lee 1991). While our 
results suggest the existence of altruist values for road safety in the Alps, we could not 
determine whether these values are driven by such paternalistic motives. What we found is,   26
however, that respondents who are rarely or never exposed to hazards on Alpine roads were 
obviously concerned about the reduction of risks threatening the lives of others. Frequently 
exposed people showed a higher risk tolerance. In line with Chilton et al. (2006), we argue 
that the marginal utility of risk reduction of these respondents is smaller, because they are 
more familiar with natural hazards and feel therefore less threatened. 
Clearly, the perception of mortality risks involved with driving on Alpine roads played 
an important role in the valuation of the traffic safety programs. This is not astonishing, since 
the standard economic model of choice implies that preferences over levels of consumption of 
goods are made up of the individual’s subjective perceptions of these goods. The expressed 
preferences are functions of attitudes, experiences, and beliefs, including both observed and 
unobserved components (McFadden 2001). We find it, therefore, surprising that the hazard 
type played a minor role in the overall valuation of the alternatives traffic safety programs 
although the attitudinal questions in the survey indicated that the respondents perceived the 
risk of car accidents as most threatening. In fact, the hazard type had an insignificant effect on 
the stated WTP, which was only about 6% lower for programs directed against avalanches 
than for programs against car accidents. There was no statistical difference between programs 
directed against rockfall or car accidents. We conclude that most respondents did not paid 
attention to the hazard type, but emphasized on the costs and expected risk reductions. 
The experimental design of our study allowed the investigation of several aspects of 
heterogeneity in preferences for mortality risk reductions. The results provide evidence for 
discerning the VSL based upon the personal background of the people at risk (Sunstein 2004). 
Besides personal characteristics such as the age or education of a respondent, the individuated 
VSL is mainly driven by the marginal utility of wealth. We found that the WTP for risk 
reductions increases over-proportionally with wealth. Though this observation corresponds 
with the assumption of marginally decreasing utility of wealth, the wealth effect is rather 
strong. We attribute the size of the wealth effect to the use of the relative bid vehicle, which 
implied high bid amounts to wealthy respondents. However, this bid structure reflects the 
progressive Swiss tax regime due to which public programs are foremost financed through 
taxes provided by wealthier citizens. 
In conclusion, we provide new insights to the valuation of road hazards on Alpine 
roads. By testing several interaction effects of personal characteristics and individual risk 
perceptions, we were able to identify sources of heterogeneity in preferences for mortality risk 
reductions. We found evidence that the utility of wealth plays a key role in the valuation of 
the proposed traffic safety programs. These results suggest that individuating the cost 
parameterand possibly also the risk parameteris a promising way to analyze differences 
in the individual WTP for mortality risk reductions.   27
Appendix 
A1 Marginal effect of a change in the cost of a mitigation program 
The marginal effect of a change in the cost parameter Ci,k on individual i’s probability Pr(k|i) 
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where β =     β1     +     Ziβ2 +     Wjβ3 denotes the compound coefficient vector of the cost interactions.  
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A2 Marginal effect of a change in the risk reduction provided by a mitigation program 
The marginal effect of a change in the risk parameter Rk on on individual i’s probability 
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  (A2) 
 
where α =     α1     +     Ziα2 +     Wjα3 denotes the compound coefficient vector of the risk reduction 
interactions.   29
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